The US Operation Against Houthis: Implications, Limitations and Strategic Objectives
Khaldoon Abdulla
On Saturday, March 15th, the United States (US) Navy and Air Force initiated a joint military operation targeting the Houthi group in Sanaa, Yemen.
The assault, which focused on the group’s stronghold in the Jeraf district of Sanaa, resulted in the deaths of nine senior Houthi members, whose identities remain undisclosed, as well as several civilian casualties.
This operation is believed to be part of a broader campaign aimed at undermining the Houthis’ human and military capital.
The strikes carry both domestic and regional implications, directly impacting the Houthis in Yemen while also serving as a strategic message to Iran, the group’s primary regional ally.
Strategic Objectives: Coercion or Decisive Action?
The US strikes against the Houthis can be interpreted as serving one of two potential strategic objectives.
The first is coercion, aimed at restoring a deterrence equation by compelling the Houthis to cease their operations against Red Sea shipping.
The second is a more decisive effort to dismantle the group’s offensive capabilities entirely.
In the context of coercion, the US strikes send a strong message to the Houthis, drawing parallels to previous experiences with Hezbollah and the Assad regime, where Iranian-backed groups faced significant setbacks, in conjunction with Iran’s relative passivity, which may drive the Houthis to de-escalate.
However, the Houthis’ recent attacks in the Red Sea, which they claim are a response to the Israeli military operations in Gaza, have become a central element of their strategic positioning, especially against their Yemeni counterparts.
This complicates the likelihood of their immediate submission to US pressure.
Given these dynamics, it is unlikely that the Houthis will hastily capitulate.
Instead, they are expected to leverage domestic and international sentiments, amplified by potential civilian casualties, as an instrument to resist US actions, utilizing the operations as evidence of their credibility and pushing for a US de-escalation.
In such scenario, the intensity and accuracy of US operations, avoiding civilian casualties, is crucial for achieving deterrence.
On the other hand, achieving a decisive outcome against the Houthis presents significant challenges for the United States.
The group’s operational flexibility and ability to utilize existing infrastructure limit the effectiveness of air and sea-based operations.
While such strikes may degrade some of the Houthis’ assets, they are unlikely to deliver a decisive blow without complementary ground operations.
This would require the involvement of a reliable Yemeni proxy, though such a partnership is fraught with several challenges and limitations.
Furthermore, a qualitative targeted approach aimed at decapitating the Houthi leadership, similar to Hezbollah, would necessitate in-depth intelligence, which the US Central Command (CENTCOM) may lack due to its limited focus on the Houthis over the past decade.
Without precise intelligence, efforts to dismantle the group’s leadership structure are likely to face significant obstacles.
Prospects
In light of these challenges, the US is more likely to focus on restoring deterrence rather than pursuing a comprehensive dismantling of the Houthi movement.
This would involve limiting the group’s offensive capabilities, particularly along the Yemeni western coast, while pushing the insurgents toward the central and northern regions of the country, probably with limited assistance from a Yemeni military partner.
Additionally, the US is expected to strengthen its military presence in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint where the US geopolitical interest extends even beyond curbing the Houthis.
KHALDOON ABDULLA is senior research Fellow in Asia Middle East Center for Research and Dialogue (AMEC)